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The position occupied by Czechoslovakia (or what might be described as the Cze-
choslovak question or agenda) in British military and political stratégy during World 
War II was of no great importanceper se. Its importance, if any, derived more from 
its relationship with other - crucial- British interests. This was true both as regards 
the original plan for the postwar stability of Central and Southeast Europe on a confe-
derative basis and Britain's later attempt to take Soviet interests in Central and Eastern 
Europe into account and do nothing which might, in that respect, stand in the "way of 
long-term Anglo-Soviet Cooperation. 
Nevertheless, as far as British policy-making was concerned the Czechoslovak 
agenda did have certain rather special overtones which ensured that it was an issue in 
its own right, and one, moreover, that required handling with kid gloves. These spe­
cial and delicate overtones had much to do with the manner in which the fate of pre-
war Czechoslovakia had been decided prior to the outbreak of war and with Great 
Britain's decisive role in that decision. I am referring, of course, to the Munich Confe­
rence of 1938 and to the developments which either resulted directly from the Munich 
Agreement or were indirectly connected with it (e. g. inactivity over the question of 
protecting the frontiers of post-Munich Czechoslovakia, and de facto recognition of 
the Slovák statě.) 
An entire set of factors came together to ensure that the restoration of the Czecho­
slovak Republic was a de facto - albeit undeclared - aim of the military and political 
alliance of the three Great Powers. These factors included: 
- Overall developments in the global military conflict, including the consequences of 
the Soviet Union's entry into the war as a belligerent power in June 1941. 
- Edvard Benes's personal drive and diplomatic acumen. 
- The fact that in British political circles the awareness gradually made itself felt that 
Czechoslovakia had been wronged and that this must be attoned for even at the cost 
of special concessions. 
One certainly should cite other factors in addition to the above, or at least expand 
on the question of the overall global conflict and the need for all available resources to 
be devoted to it including ideas and ideologies. All of these had the effect of trans-
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forming the Czechoslovak Government-in Exile, which had started life inauspi-
ciously as the Czechoslovak National Committee, into a fully-fledged "minor ally" 
and partner in European politics. 
Once the Czechoslovak government had been acknowledged as a partner in bi-late-
ral relations and in the "United Nations" alliance (though, admittedly, its position was 
still rather weak in comparison with the Polish government in London, for example), 
it was precisely Great Britain - far more than the other Great Powers of the anti-Hitler 
coalition - which found itself confronted by the Czechoslovak governmenťs particu-
larconcerns, plans andintentions. By all evidence, the Czechoslovak government was 
to prove a great nuisance as a partner to the British in light of the lengthy struggle 
which they had to wage for recognition and legitimacy1, and in order to be ranked 
among the other "minor allies". An additional cause was the profound despair into 
which the Czechoslovaks had been plunged after the foundering of their sovereign 
statě which was exacerbated by the bitter blows they suffered during the first years of 
emigration, all of which engendered an enormous inferiority complex. 
This was a factor with which Soviet diplomacy undoubtedly reckoned when skill-
fully exploiting the desire of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile to increase its pre-
stige, without displaying the least embarassment over the Soviet Union's behaviour 
while the Russo-German Pact was still in force. July 1941 was to be the Czechoslovak 
governmenťs "Sternstunde" as the Germans say. In other words, there was an upswing 
in its fortunes, most of all because of the brazen Soviets' volte-face, when - virtually 
overnight - they were ready to recognise the Czechoslovak Government in London 
as the representative of the Czechoslovak statě in its pre-Munich frontiers.2 It was this 
readiness on the part of the Soviets that finally got the Czechoslovak talks with the Bri­
tish out of their blind alley. Apart from certain other practical considerations, the fact 
that it offered one government in exile the chance to be a "negotiating partner" of the 
"Great Powers" was also bound to háve played a major role in the Czechoslovak go­
vernmenťs tenacious assertion, in summer 1943, of its readiness to sign a treaty with 
the Soviet Union (in the face of British objections). One can readily appreciate how 
tempting the chance was to be placed, in a sense, on the samé footing as the British who 
had signed a similar twenty-year treaty with the Soviet Union in 1942. 
During the last sixteen months of war on the European continent, the importance 
of the Czechoslovak agenda within British stratégy - as earlier characterised - remai-
ned unchanged, orevendiminished. The ideafor aPolish-Czechoslovakconfederation 
was finally buried as an outcome of Russian Opposition to any confederative plans. 
Britain yielded to the Soviets on the question of the so-called "self-denying ordinance" 
(agreement not to conclude treaties on post-war matters with the so-called "minor 
allies"). This was when in the course of negotiations on that point of the programme 
at the tri-partitě Conference of f oreign ministers in Moscow in October 1943, Anthony 
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Eden unexpectedly gave British blessing to the conclusion of a Soviet-Czechoslovak 
Treaty. 
What undoubtedly influenced the level of British commitment, or more precisely 
Britain's reluctance or reservě in matters concerning Czechoslovakia (such as assi-
stance for the Slovák uprising in autumn 1944 and refusal to commit itself to providing 
military aid to uprisings in Bohemia and Moravia in the closing phases of the war) was 
the combination of circumstances which determined the Overall British position and 
its active rádius in the final months of hostilities. 
The following factors seem to have been uppermost in British thinking: 
1. In Central and a large part of Eastern Europe the overwhelming might of the So­
viets was increasingly evident, while ignorance prevailed as to what use or misuse 
the Soviets would put their military presence in the area. What was clear, was that 
the Soviets were in a position to dictate a Solution of their own, and there was no 
force in the area to prevent them from doing so. Under the circumstances, the Bri­
tish strove to respect what they regarded as the legitimate interests of Soviet secu-
rity. They did what they could to allay Soviet suspicions, particularly in view of the 
bitter lesson of the Warsaw Uprising. By adopting a position of restraint and avoi-
ding conflicts of any kind, they sought to preserve a basis for future Cooperation 
with the Soviet Union which they regarded as a sine qua non both for victory in the 
war and for an all-embracing post-war global settlement. It must be borne in mind 
that in 1944 the British and Americans estimated that the war with Japan could drag 
on for an additional eighteen months folowing the cessation of hostilities in 
Europe. With a view to protecting their vital interests, the British were subse-
quently to concentrate on those areas which had priority in their eyes: Western 
Europe and Greece. They did not, however, renounce their interest in the Central 
European Situation and continued their efforts to make certain of some post-war 
influence in that area as well. They had to take into account the American Presi­
dent^ repeated assertion that American troops would withdraw from Europe 
during the six months following an armistice. 
2. Britain's influence on military and political decisions in Europe, particularly in the 
last ten months of hostilities, declined in favour of the United States. This was an-
other reason why the British initiative in favour of a more rapid advance of General 
Dwight D. Eisenhower's allied expeditionary force towards Czechoslovakia and 
the occupation of Prague, met with so little success. 
Foreign Office minutes provide a fairly accurate definition of British priorities in 
1944 as regards Czechoslovakia. They are remarkable not only for their frankness but 
also because they coincide with how we would assess these priorities with historical 
hindsight several decades later. Frank K. Roberts of the Central European Depart­
ment noted on 29th May 1944 that the primary purpoäe of Benes's policy was to 
maintain the balance between east and west, that Beneš was rather anxious about 
future Russian intentions and had no desire "to be left alone in Soviet Company". Ro­
berts' minuté went on to point out that Beneš and the Czechoslovak Government had 
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been at great pains to improve their relations with the British and to obtain from Lon­
don some concrete gesture of continuing British interest in Czechoslovakia. It was in 
Britain's interest "to encourage this healthy tendency in Czech policy", provided 
though, that it would not involve the British in "undesirable commitments or in any 
trouble with the Russians".3 
The second reservation needs neither comment nor explanation. There is plenty of 
documentary evidence of the great pains the British took to avoid any trouble with 
the Soviets. On closer examination, the first reservation, "undesirable commitments," 
can be seen to conceal a whole number of very different considerations: 
a) "undesirable commitments" meant anything that might prejudice future decisions 
on matters reserved - in the British view - for talks on a peace treaty or for decision 
by the "principál Allies," for example the question of Czechoslovakia's definitive 
frontiers and the transfer of the Germans from Czechoslovakia, or questions on which 
the British regarded their hands as tied by American policy, which would be solved lá­
teř as part of an overall post-war settlement of security questions; 
b) another "undesirable commitment", for instance, would háve been the British ac-
ceptance of any military commitments guaranteeing the post-war security of Cze­
choslovakia against German aggression such as were contained in the Soviet-Czecho­
slovak Treaty. (See Appendix 1. "Extract from the Memorandum on Soviet Policy in 
Europa, 9."); 
c) equally "undesirable" of course, was any allied treaty with Czechoslovakia. 
Roberts should háve added still one more objection: the limitations resulting from 
the exhaustion of British resources of all kinds. That particular consideration was un-
doubtedly another reason why the British could not háve adequately encouraged the 
Czechoslovak exile governmenťs "healthy tendencies" however much they might 
háve wanted to, had circumstances and concern for their priorities permitted. 
The upshot of all this was that during 1944 and 1945 the basic attitude adopted by 
the British political and military circles in respect of the Czechoslovak agenda, was to 
réact only, and not to develop any initiatives of their own. Each of the outside initiati­
ves - most of them from the Czechoslovak government - was, in the light of the reser-
vations voiced by Roberts, laboriously negotiated by the British, in an obvious 
attempt not to inform their Czechoslovak partner about British negative attitudes or 
decisions and because they had such little scope to respond positively to the Czecho-
slovaks' suggestions and requests. 
One might well ask whether the British attidude toward the Czechoslovak de-
mands, requests and proposals was influenced by the Czechoslovak governmenťs in-
sistence on sticking to its pian for a Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty against the express 
wishes of the British. In other words, did that treaty give rise to a rupture between 
Beneš and the Czechoslovak government, on the one hand, and the British govern­
ment or diplomatic corps on the other, which took the subsquent form of a certain 
coolness on the part of the British towards Czechoslovak issues ? I do not think so. 
Certainly, several times during the summer and early autumn of 1943, Foreign 
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Secretary Eden was put out by the intransigence of the Czechoslovak side towards 
his arguments. On more than one occasion he expressed his discontent in the form of 
cutting remarks about Beneš in Foreign Office minutes. And when he informed 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill from Moscow about the outcome of discussions on 
the item "agreements between major and minor allies on post-war questions" at the 
Conference on 24 October (". . . I told M. Molotov at the close of discussion, that I had 
no objections to make and that I thought the Treaty a good one for its purpose") 4 he 
added in the following cable: "I trust we shall offer Beneš no bouquets. His part in this 
business seems to háve been to telí half-truths to either side, making as a result a good 
deal of unnecessary mischief."5 
Nevertheless, itwas clear to Anthony Eden and all others involved that on this issue, 
they had yielded to Soviet pressure and had compromised with the Soviets and no one 
eise. After all, the dispute over the Treaty had by then long ceased to be the petty duel 
between the Czechoslovak Government and the British Foreign Office or Eden, that 
it had seemed to be, say - up to the beginning of July 1943. In the Foreign Office (see 
Alexander Cadogan's letter to Churchill of 25 October 1943)6 it was evident that in 
agreeing with Molotov and signing the Treaty, Eden was acting contrary to the British 
Cabineťs decision of 28 September 1943 which hehimself had tabled.7 The result: the 
protocol to the Treaty which made it possible for Poland subsequently to accede to the 
agreement, could hardly háve been "little more than a face-saving device" as Cadogan 
described it. It certainly did not correspond to one of the alternative instructions in the 
Cabinet decision mentioned, which was formulated as "the desirability of a tripartitě 
Soviet-Polish-Czechoslovak arrangement, possibly with British participation".8 
And Eden nevěr - even in his memoirs - explained the reasons for his change of 
heart, which one of his recent biographers has criticised as capitulation.9 Cadogan's 
view in the letter mentioned was that "wider considerations arising out of the Moscow 
talks" were the likely explanation for Eden's change of attitude from the negative one 
he held at the moment he left for Moscow. It is possible to find only one subsequent 
attempt in Foreign Office minutes to interpret the reasons why "the British Govern-
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ment" changed its opinion of the question of a Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty. As the 
British ambassador to the Czechoslovak government, Philip Nichols, told Capsalis, 
Greece's minister to Benes's government, in course of conversation on 8 December 
1943: 
. . . it may háve been that the Secretary of State, viewing the negotiations as a 
whole at Moscow, had felt that it would be wise not to insist on a negative attitude 
towards this treaty and had theref ore approved it with a view to ensuring the suc-
cess of the negotiations as a whole. 1 0 
Thus the Treaty was signed with the "official blessing" of the British, as Nichols la­
ter recalled. n On his return from Moscow at the beginning of 1944, Beneš was far 
from being persona non grata. On his way back to England, he had been received in 
Algiers by Churchill who met with him for over four hours. 1 2 The main item of their 
talks was the Polish issue. Churchill cabled Roosevelt shortly afterwards that (Beneš) 
"may be most useful in trying to make the Poles see reason and in reconciling them to 
the Russians".1 3 
Beneš arrived in London on 6 January and two days later was the guest at a political 
luncheon with the Foreign Secretary. Describing that conversation to Churchill, Eden 
stated rather cynically: " . . . we had a good session . . . We arranged a pian of campaign 
with the Poles. He will see Mikolajczyk on Monday and I will follow up 24 hours later 
when Mikolajczyk has had a chance to digest Beneš' lecture." 14 
It is not our concern here to pass judgement on the practices of the British diplo­
matic kitchen or comment on the fact that the British ušed Beneš as their foward line 
in their campaign to put pressure on Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, or on the fact that Beneš 
accepted that role. What was entailed, no less, was putting pressure on the Polish go­
vernment to concur with the Soviet position on the question of Polanďs eastern fron­
tiers and to accept territorial compensation in eastern Prussia and Silesia - a pian that 
had been discussed at Teheran and enjoyed Churchill's ardent support. 1 5 
This episode has been mentioned because it serveš to show that Beneš was not out 
of favour with the British after the signing of the Treaty. Were one to engage in the 
"what might háve happened if" variety of hypothesis, one could go so far as to say that 
the British approach to the question of Czechoslovakia during 1944-45, in both gene­
rál andparticular matters, would háve been basically the samé had there been no Soviet-
Czechoslovak Treaty. British policy towards Czechoslovakia was determined by hi­
gher priorities, or was dictated by external circumstances of such importance that against 
their background the existence of the Treaty in question was more or less irrelevant. 
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Roberts was correct in his assessment of what he described as "healthy tendencies" 
in the policies of Dr. Beneš and the Czechoslovak government. As of March 1944, 
in the suggestions brought forward by the Czechoslovak government and military 
circles one can indeed observe signs of a kind of diplomatic offensive (with the modest 
means at their disposal) aimed at bolstering the Czechoslovak position in the West and 
ensuring a Western influence and presence (British above all) on Czechoslovak terri­
tory in the final phase of the war, even should the Anglo-American units not reach 
Czechoslovakia. It should be pointed out, however, that in 1944 no one counted on 
their doing so, least of all the Anglo-American supreme command as a whole. 
There can be no doubt that the Czechoslovak Government in London wanted to 
sign a treaty on the lineš of the agreement with the Russians, with either or both of the 
main Western allies. This was out of the question, however, and Czechoslovak diplo-
macy realised it was futile even to broach the matter with the British. (As Nichols 
wrote to Cadogan in July 1944: "The Czechs would like, of course, to conclude a 
treaty with ourselves similar to the one they signed in Moscow last December, but this 
we are not at present prepared to grant." 1 6 
For this reason, they tried to obtain at least a symbolic gesture such as an agreement 
between the British and Americans and the Czechoslovak government on an adjust­
ment of relations between the Czechoslovak civil administration and the allied Com­
manders, in páce with the liberation of Czechoslovak territory (described as a "Civil 
Affairs Agreement"). 
Such an agreement became a topical issue in Czechoslovak-Soviet relations in the 
Spring of 1944 as Soviet troops drew nearer to the territory which had been part of the 
Czechoslovak Republic before the war. Neither the British nor the Americans, who 
received a proposal for a Civil Affairs Agreement from the Czechoslovak representa-
tives, and were informed by the Soviets that Czechoslovak-Soviet talks on these lineš 
were already in progress - regarded such an agreement as appropriate in their čase. 
They expressed understanding for such an adjustment in relations between the Soviet 
high command and the Czechoslovak authorities, but in view of the geographical fac­
tors and the remote likelihood of British or American units entering Czechoslovak 
territory for the time being, they politely declined to deal with the matter. 1 7 
The Czechoslovak side was equally unsuccessful with another proposal they tabled 
to ensure a symbolic British involvement in Czechoslovakia at the end of the war. In 
this čase, there was an attempt to see whether the British government was willing to 
appoint a liaison officer or military mission of some kind to the representative that the 
Czechoslovak government was intending to send to the territory liberated by the So­
viet army. Discussions within the Foreign Office reached the conclusion that a British 
officer in that capacity would inevitably become a de facto British respresentative to 
the local Soviet military command, with the implicit complications that might involve. 
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Their main fear was, however, that such a Solution, were the Soviets to accept it, might 
give the Soviets the idea of making a counter-proposal, that is the appointment of a So-
viet liaison officer or military mission to any of the representatives of the allied Anglo-
American command in individual Western European countries.18 
In May 1944, discussions within the Foreign Office culminated in the view that the 
rejection of the Czechoslovak proposals ("none of them practicable") should be offset 
by a public gesture to demonstrate that the British had not lost interest in Czechoslo-
vakia and its future. The most suitable gesture was thought to be a Statement in reply 
to an inspired parliamentary question. Any suspicions that the Soviets might have that 
it was an Operation with wider political overtones could be dispelled by informing 
them of these plans beforehand.19 
The implementation of-this proposal, originally scheduled for the beginning of 
June, was postponed, among other reasons because at that time the Czechoslovak 
government, without prior consultation with the British and against their wishes, 
recognised General Charles De Gaulle's French National Liberation Committee. 
Some weeks later, when the Central European Department raised the issue of the par-
liamentary question again, Eden's first reaction was still negative: 
I don't much like this, and I think would get some pretty nasty supplementa-
ries. Czecho-Slovakia is not populär in any quarter of this house just now, and 
Dr. Beneš is much distrusted. All this may be unjust, but it is a consequence of 
what is regarded as Dr. Benes's over-eagerness to obey Moscow's behest. Un-
friendly people describe Dr. B. as Stalin's jackal. 
Therefore if this question has to be asked it had better be written not oral. Per-
sonally I should prefer to have it entirely alone, for I don't want to be fulsome to 
Dr. Beneš and his Govt. just now. I don't consider that they have done anything 
to deserve compliments from us.20 
It was to require a vigorous appeal on the part of Nichols to get things moving again. 
Among other things, Nichols wrote: 
What the Czechs want, and what, I believe, it is to our interest to supply, is 
some public declaration, which can be quoted back to their own country, to the 
effect that we have not in fact lost interest in them and that we wish them well and 
a secure and prosperous future . . . The alternative is a continued silence which is 
very likely to be misinterpreted both here and in the occupied territories: for it 
will no doubt be regarded as confirmation of the fact that we look upon them as 
sold to the Russians.21 
The parliamentary question and answer - carefully prepared in the Foreign Office -
were duly read out on 2 August 1944. Explaining why there was no need for an Anglo-
Czechoslovak agreement for the administration of the liberated territory, the Foreign 
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Secretary's reply stressed the warm and sympathetic interest of the British government 
in the future of Czechoslovakia and the maintenance of amicable relations with Be-
neš's government (see Appendix). 
With the aim of increasing British influence and presence on Czechoslovak terri­
tory, the Czechoslovak Government strove, during the course of 1944, forincreased 
British support for the resistance in Slovakia and the Czech lands. Even in this čase, 
the results were fairly meagre. 
The modest supply of weapons for he Slovák resistance - intended as the first of its 
kind - which the Czechoslovak side had requested in mid-July, failed to materialise 
because the British made it conditional on prior agreement of the Soviets. At first 
Moscow was evasive and then maintained a stony silence until the matter was no lon­
ger relevant.22 
When the rising in Slovakia finally took place, and support from abroad was a mat­
ter of life or death for the insurgents, the Czechoslovak government urgently appealed 
to Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union for assistance in the form of wea­
pons deliveries, the bombing of military targets in Slovakia and recognition of the in­
surgents as belligerents. The Foreign Office and then the British Chiefs of Staff 
adopted the following position: 
- Slovakia is in the Soviet operational sphere and any really effective aid must come 
from the Russians. 
- N o action can be taken unless the Russians are in complete accord. 
- N o supply drops can be approved until Moscow has shown clear approval of the 
rising. 
- Belligerent status can only be declared if the Soviet government acts jointly.2 3 
The guiding principle on the British side was without disinteresting themselves or 
rebuffing the Czechs, they must leave it to the Soviets to také the initiative with regard 
to the Slovák rising.24 Moscow remained deaf to all British enquiries as to Soviet inten-
tions with regard to the Slovák rising, and this Stance condemned the British to total 
inactivity. In the end the latter decided to drop a small consignment of medical 
supplies in mid-September, and in October, three weeks after the Soviets accorded the 
insurgents belligerent status, the British government followed suit. 
During the last week of October, shortly before the collapse of the Slovák insur­
gent front, the Foreign Office changed course and told the British Chiefs of Staff to au-
thorise the Special Operations Executive (SOE) to make small deliveries of specialized 
military materiál of the kind requested by the insurgents in Slovakia.25 The decision of 
the Chiefs of Staff was negative, mainly on the grounds that any effective help would 
involve at least 100 to 200 aircraft which was beyond the resources of the entire Medi-
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terranean theatre.26 The decision was then made known to the Czechoslovak side in 
accordance with the agreed formula that only military considerations had prevented 
British assistance to the Slovák rising.27 
The attempt to obtain more extensive British help for the resistance in Bohemia and 
Moravia met a similar fate. At the end of September 1944, the Czechoslovak supreme 
military Commander approached the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (C. I. G. S.) 
to discuss requests from the Czechoslovak military command for assistance to ensure 
the success of the armed risings planned for Bohemia and Moravia towards the end of 
the war. The response was negative and took no account of Foreign Office political 
arguments, especially those advanced by Nichols. It explained that effective support 
for a large scale rising, including air Operations, could only come from the Soviet 
forces.28 
Thus, as before, the only support that the British side was prepared to offer was the 
despatch, via the SOE, of weapons and materials sokly for Sabotage Operations in the 
Protectorate. It is true that in December 1944 there was a decision to increase the 
number of sorties from ten to twenty a month, although later, the need to give priority 
to Italy and Yugoslavia led the Chiefs of Staff to cut the number of sorties back to their 
previous level.29 This created a delicate Situation: the Czechoslovak authorities in 
London did not dare telí the resistance organisations at home pressing for help in the 
form of more and more weapons the unadorned truth and inform them that the wea-
pons they wanted from Britain would not be forthcoming.30 The British were aware 
of the problém but they had only one fundamental concern: that they should not have 
to bear the responsibility for a rising in Bohemia and Moravia to which they could not 
lend effective support. The BBCs Czechoslovak broadcasts were carefully vetted to 
ensure that no call to arms should be sent to Czechoslovakia, whose outcome might 
place the British in a sticky Situation.31 
The second area of concern with which the Czechoslovaks approached the British, 
and which constituted a major part of the Czechoslovak agenda of British policies in 
the final sixteen months of the war, related to Czechoslovak requirements in connec-
tion with the drafting of armistice and surrender terms with German and Hungaiy. 
The European Advisory Commission was to deal with these questions and the 
Czechoslovak government duly presented that body with a list of their objectives in 
August 1944.32 What was decisive for the Commission's deliberations, of course, 
were the views of the four governments it represented. If the Czechoslovak govern-
ment was to have any chance of success with it proposals, it would have to win support 
for them from the governments of the great powers. 
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Of the various requests presented by the Czechoslovak side, it regarded two as 
crucial: 
- the question of the area over which the Czechoslovak government would exercise 
administrative control after the signing of an armistice with Germany; 
- the Czechoslovak plan for the mass expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia. 
The first of these in fact concerned only the British, because Great Britain was the 
only one of the three major allied powers to have reserved its position on the question 
of Czechoslovakia's definitive frontiers even after the Munich Agreement had been 
declared null and void, in the sense that a final settlement would have to be decided by 
a post-war peace treaty. Confirmation that the British no longer regarded themselves 
bound by the Munich Agreement was contained in the formula that the British Go­
vernment "would not be influenced by any changes effected in and since 1938".3 3 
The problém now was the territory which the Czechoslovak government was to ad-
minister pending a final decision on the question of the Czechoslovak State frontiers. 
Discussion on this issue lasted from September 1944 to March 1945.3 4 The British side 
was agreed that the Czechoslovak government should exercise administrative autho­
rity within the pre-Munich frontiers, irrespective of the fact that parts of that territory 
had been annexed during 1938 and 1939 by Germany, Hungary and Poland. When 
discussions opened, their reservation about this generál principle concerned two main 
points above all: 
- the formula they proposed spoke in terms of administrative control over the terri­
tory in question, not "sovereignty" as Beneš had wanted, a term they rejected in 
principle on legal grounds; 
- the allocation of Těšínsko (the Teschen area) was a matter to be settled by the two 
allies concerned, Poland and Czechoslovakia. 
Eden subsequently gave way on the second point, in January 1945, when he sub-
mitted the matter to the Cabinet for discussion. In his memorandum he explained that 
the Polish occupation of Těšínsko at the time of Munich "inflicted a wrong upon Cze­
choslovakia". He feit this justified the Czechoslovak demand to administer "the Te­
schen area" pending a final territorial settlement, in the same way as the other areas 
concerned.3 5 
In the end, the term "administrative control" was replaced by the formula "füll po­
litical authority", and the expression "pre-Munich frontiers" was superseded by a for­
mula which avoided reference to the events of 1938. The eventual formulation of 20 
March 1945 expressed the British governmenťs agreement that the Czechoslovaks 
should exercise füll political authority from the date of the unconditional surrender of 
Germany, throughout the area bounded by the frontiers of Czechoslovakia as these 
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existed before 31 December 1937. The question of the final settlement of Czechoslo­
vak frontiers was to remain in abeyance until the international frontiers in Central 
Europe were definitely laid down in the peace treaty.3 8 
If on the first of these questions so cherished by the Czechoslovaks, the British go­
vernment even mutely accepted a greater part of Benes's theories about legal conti-
nuity, they were not accommodating in their stand concerning the fate of the German 
population in Czechoslovakia. 
Regarding the latter, the Czechoslovak government set out a detailed proposal in a 
memorandum sent to the British, Americans and Russians on 23 November 1944.37 
The main points were: 
- The Czechoslovak statě was to be established along national lineš, with neither the 
Germans nor the Hungarians enjoying minority rights; 
- All the Germans in Czechoslovakia, savé those who had actively fought for Cze­
choslovak liberation were to lose their Czechoslovak citizenship; 
- Of the 3 million or so Germans living in the Czechoslovak Republic according to 
the 1930 census, no more than 800,000 would be allowed to remain. The rest, unless 
they had fled or died in the mean time, were to be expelled from Czechoslovakia. 
The figuře assumed for the organised transfer was at least 1,600,000 Germans. (A 
similar Solution was proposed for Czechoslovakia's Hungarian population). 
This was the final version of the proposals which had gradually crystallised on the 
Czechoslovak side over a period of several years. They had previously been submitted 
to the British as preliminary items for discussion on which the Czechoslovak govern­
ment sought immediate agreement from the three great powers or at least some sort of 
guarantee, before their return to the homeland. 
During the previous years, the British had not committed themselves to supporting 
the Czechoslovak government in any one of its specific demands and proposals as 
regards the transfer of the Germans. Britain stuck to the position conveyed to the 
Czechoslovak side as early as 1942, according to which 
"His Majesty's Government. . . have approved the generál principle of a trans­
fer to Germany of German minorities in central and south-eastern Europe after 
the war, in cases where this seems necessary and desirable."3 8 
Neither on receipt of the Czechoslovak memorandum nor at any time up to the end 
of the war, did the British give the Czechoslovak side any assurance of support for any 
of its demands. In fact they were to remain silent on them right up to the Potsdam 
Conference. 
On Instructions from the Foreign Office, Ambassador Nichols sent Czechoslovak 
Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk a notě on 17 January 1945 which stated among other 
things: 
3 6
 Ibid. W.P.(45) 180 20.3.45 Czechoslovak Frontiers (Memorandum by Eden, and 
Formula). 
3 7
 PRO FO 371/38946 Nichols Despatch 189 to Eden 28. 11. 1945. 
3
« PRO CAB 65 War Cabinet Concl. 86 (42) 6.7.42; CAB 66/26 W. P. (42) 280 2.7.42 Anglo-
Czechoslovak Relations Memorandum by Eden; FO 371/34352 Eden to Campbell 1077 
13.9.43. 
V.Prečan, British Attitudes towards Czechoslovakia 85 
As . . . this memorandum (of 23rd November) raises very important issues in 
connection with the whole German settlement, His Majesty's Government do 
not feel able to offer observations until they have discussed these questions with 
their principál allies . . . For the time being, therefore, His Majesty's Govern­
ment must reservě their attitude in regard to the proposals contained in the 
memorandum of the Czechoslovak Government. 3 9 
At the same time, the Foreign Office instructed its ambassadors in Moscow, Was­
hington and Paris to convey this Standpoint to the governments represented in the 
European Advisory Commission, the body which the British regarded as the correct 
forum for discussion of the Czechoslovak demands.4 0 
In the course of February 1945, the British started to exert great pressure on the 
Czechoslovak representatives in London not to take any decision on the matter nor to 
make any Statement about it without prior consultation and agreement with the great 
powers. They had no objections to Beneš publicly declaring his relevant plans on his 
return to Czechoslovakia and justifying them on the grounds that these objectives had 
been submitted for the consideration of the maj or allies. They did insist, however, that 
the Czechoslovak government do nothing that might commit the great powers or to 
which they had not given prior consent. This also applied to the planned legislation to 
deprive those of German origin of their Czechoslovak citizenship.41 
The British feared that Beneš would not respect their Standpoint and requests, and 
would make a public Statement likely to cause them embarassment. For this reason 
Nichols was asked to send the Czechoslovak government a further note which stres-
sed, by reference to the note of 17 January, that: 
His Majesty's Government wish to make it clear that they have not yet them-
selves reached agreement with their principál Allies upon the manner in which 
the whole question . . . should be dealt with. 4 2 
As noted earlier, this position remained unchanged up to the Potsdam Conference. 
In March 1945, a discussion about the framework of short-term British policy to­
wards Czechoslovakia took place in the Foreign Office. The occasion was provided by 
preparations for the departure of the first section of the British embassy for the site 
from which the Czechoslovak government would temporarily operáte. The Sugge­
stion came from Nichols and his formulation was received with generál agreement. 
Nichols formulated Britain's main aims with regard to Czechoslovakia as follows: 
to ensure that Czechoslovakia did not fall completely within the Soviet orbit, but that 
it would continue to be dependent upon the Western Powers as well as the Soviet 
Union, and would continue to follow the lead of the major allied powers in the generál 
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area of security and reconstruction; Britain should seek to improve upon the pre-war 
Standards of its commercial exchanges with Czechoslovakia; and lastly, Britain should 
strive to achieve a pre-eminent position among the Western powers as regards cultural 
relations with post-war Czechoslovakia.43 
Nichols was ready to leave for Košice in the last week of March 1945. His luggage 
was already on its way when the Soviets sent a message that "due to accomodation dif-
ficulties", they could not agree to Western diplomatic missions accredited to the Cze-
choslovak government - this concerned chiefly the British and Americans - transfer-
ring to the liberated territory of Czechoslovakia. In discussing this Soviet act of ob-
structionism, Churchill wondered in passing if the Soviet might be intending to telí the 
American ambassador whether he could také a toothbrush with him or not, in the 
event of the Americans reaching Prague first.44 
The limited scope of this article prevents consideration of Eden's and Churchill's in-
itiative of April 1945 in favour of a faster American advance towards Czechoslovakia 
and Prague. Suffice it to say that in my view this initiative provided no evidence of any 
change in British policy towards Czechoslovakia. 
APPENDIX 
Parliamentary Question, Ind August 1944* 
Captain Gammans asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether His Majesty's 
Government intend to conclude with the Czechoslovak Government an agreement for the admi-
nistration of liberated Czechoslovak territory similar to those recently concluded by His Maje-
sty's Government and the United States Government with the Governments of Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Norway. 
Mr. Eden: His Majesty's Government trust that the liberation of Czechoslovakia by the uni-
ted efforts of the Allied nations and of the Czechoslovak people will not now be long delayed. 
They accordingly welcomed the recent Liberation Agreement between the Soviet and Czecho-
slovak Governments, about which they were kept fully informed in advance. These Agreements 
are, however, intended to meet certain immediate practical necessities arising out of the entry of 
liberating forces into Allied territory. In view of the present disposition of Allied Forces, no use-
ful purpose would at present be served by an Anglo-Czechoslovak agreement on similar lineš. I 
am, however, glad of this opportunity of reaffirming the warm and sympathetic interest of His 
Majesty's Government in the future welfare of Czechoslovakia and their desire that the close and 
amicable relations now happily existing between them and Dr. Beneš' Government in London 
shall be maintained and developed between the peoples of the two countries after Czechoslova-
kia has resumed her rightful place as an independent nation, making her own contribution once 
again to the stability and prosperity of Central Europe. 
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Extract from the Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on Soviet 
Policy in Europe, 9 August 1944* 
8. Relations between Russia and the territories now comprising Czechoslovakia have been 
traditionally friendly. There has never been any source of dispute, and the Soviet Union clearly 
bases its Central European policy largely upon the fixed point of the Soviet-Czechoslovak 
Treaty of 1943. Soviet readiness to leave Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia within Czechoslovakia 
despite the close kinship between the Ruthenians and the Ukrainians is a measure of Soviet con-
fidence in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Union also seems perfectly prepared to accept the present 
social structure in Czechoslovakia, and to deal with the bourgeois politicans who form the pre­
sent Czechoslovak Government. Russia is probably sufficiently sure of Czechoslovak support 
in the last resort to raise no objection to Dr. Benes's policy of maintaining a balance between the 
East and the West, and therefore of strengthening his ties with this country and with France as a 
counterpart to the Czech-Soviet Treaty. In fact, Czechoslovakia is probably as useful to Russia 
as a link with the West as she may be to us as a link with the East. 
9. It is clearly unnecessary and undesirable for this country to assume military commitments 
in Czechoslovakia similar to those assumed by Russia under the Czech-Soviet Treaty. On the 
other hand, it is to our interest that Czechoslovakia should remain independent and strong, and 
for that purpose should be protected from any repetition of German aggression by reliance upon 
Soviet military support. It is equally to our interest that Czechoslovakia should remain a stable 
political, social and economic element in Central Europe, and for that purpose that our relations 
with the restored Czechoslovakia, which is likely to remain a "petit bourgeois" State as she was 
before the war, should be close and intimate. Czechoslovakia will look to this country for in-
creased economic and cultural exchanges. We should be well advised to take advantage of this to 
spread British influence in Czechoslovakia and thus throughout Central Europe. 
* PRO CAB 66/53 W. P. (44) 436, Annex III. Central Europe. 
Brief for the Secretary of State's luncheon with President Benešprepared by the Central 
Department ofthe British Foreign Office, 24 November 1944 (Extract)* 
Support for a generál rising 
The Czechoslovak Government have of course urged His Majesty's Government to send mili­
tary assistance to the recent rising in Slovakia. They have also pressed us to commit ourselves to 
support a generál rising in Bohemia and Moravia in due course. Both of these requests have had 
to be turned down by the Chiefs of Staff on the grounds that Czechoslovakia is at present too far 
from an active British theatre of Operations to make effective support a practical proposition 
without serious prejudice to other Operations of more direct concern and assistance to ourselves. 
The importance, from the political point of view, of our not misleading the Czechs that we are 
abandoning them entirely to the Russians, was of course fully taken into account before these 
decisions were reached. It was, however, decided, as is inevitable in time of war, that the military 
objections raised by the Chiefs of Staff were decisive. Mr. Nichols suggests that it is important 
that, if an opportunity arises, the Secretary of State should leave Dr. Beneš in no doubt that our 
recent desicions were taken on purely military grounds and that, although the military argu­
ments were overwhelming, they do not of course affect our generál attidude towards Czechoslo­
vakia, either now or in the future. 
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